Royal Prerogative refers to the powers Her Majesty wields,
either of her own accord or under advice from her ministers.
They are vast and somewhat poorly understood. They are also
rarely used unilaterally. Even so, their mere existence has at
times led to calls for them to be taken away or modified in
some way.

In Canada the most obvious examples of powers that some
want limits placed on would be the power to prorogue
parliament, dissolve parliament, and call by-elections. As it
happens Britain has modified some of these powers so it
might be instructive to look at what results it has produced.

Westminster is known as the Mother of all
Parliaments. It is what our parliament and
many others base their structure on. This
can sometimes obscure the fact that the
British Parliament didn't stop evolving in the meantime. The
Westminster Parliament our own sought to emulate is very
different these days. One of the ways it has become different
only ​went into effect in 2011. The Canadian Crown may
dissolve Parliament (usually on the advice of the prime
minister). The British Crown has lost this ability. In technical
terms those powers were put into abeyance. James Bowden
over at the Parliamentum blog has an in-depth look at the
Fixed-term Parliament Act (the legislation that now governs
when parliament is dissolved in Britain).

The act was passed so that prime ministers could no longer
time elections in their favour. Now, this strikes me as a bit of
a solution in search of a problem. After all, their is good
evidence that voters punish politicians who blatantly try to
​game the system in this way. Which is something the British
Prime Minister ought to have kept in mind back in 2017 when
she used the act (and a willing opposition) to get an early
election called and returned to parliament politically
weakened.

You might expect this to mean the government would have a
short life. Normally, you would be right but the most
immediate effect of the Fixed-term Parliament Act has been
to make it harder for governments to be defeated. It is no
longer the case that merely losing a vote is seen as a matter of
confidence, it has to be explicitly stated in a separate motion.
Which means MPs can vote against a bill while later voting to
keep the government alive. And even if a confidence motion
does succeed parliament still has 14 days to find a new prime
minister and avoid an early election.   

This has had some pretty nasty effects on good governance.
The British Conservatives have been able to remain in
government while engaged in a civil war within their own
party. With both the Conservative and Labour Parties
statistically tied since the end of 2017 the Conservatives
want to avoid an election if possible. It has gotten so bad the
Queen has started to have to gently remind MPs to do
their job.

This means that MPs never face a reckoning for how they
vote in Parliament. Had the previous method still been in
effect Britain would likely by now have gone through an
election ​and a new parliament would have been sworn in. This
would have had two positive effects;
1. It would calm demands for a second referendum since
there is little chance the election campaign wouldn't become
an unofficial referendum on Brexit. 
2. Having just fought an election the various factions in
Parliament would be in no condition to fight another one.
This is part of the reason why new governments are given a
bit of leeway in setting the agenda.

Would this have prevented the Brexit votes from reaching the
heights of absurdity that they have now? It is a definite
maybe. At the very least it would avoid the deadlock I often
​decry in the American system. An important safety valve has
been removed from the British state and one would hope it is
restored promptly.

Loyally Yours,
A Kisaragi Colour

Elizabeth May was born in Hartford,
Connecticut to Stephanie and John May in
1954. While both parents were born in New
York, her father was raised in England. Her
father's influence on his daughter's turn to
monarchism can only be guessed at. He 
served in both the British Home Guard and
US Army Air Corps. Later in life he took to
immersing himself in the culture of his
Highland Scottish ancestors and creating
miniature armies from the Napoleonic
Wars. Elizabeth May is a practicing Anglican has even said
her long term goals include being ordained as an Anglican
Priest.

First elected as a Member of Parliament in 2011 Elizabeth
May has been both vocal and eager about her support for
Canada's monarchy. Her tribute to Her Majesty on the
occasion of her Diamond Jubilee remains one of the most
detailed defences of the Canadian Crown ever given in the
​House of Commons.

Of particular concern to Ms. May has been the slow move
towards a more 'presidential' prime minister. In May of 2015
she noted that the government of the day had tried to find a
new place to greet foreign dignitaries and heads of state other
than Rideau Hall (the Governor General's residence). This
concern about presidentialism seems to be a key part of Ms.
May's monarchism. In her book Losing Confidence: Power,
Politics and the Crisis in Canadian Democracy published in
​2010 May wrote:

Elizabeth May has also spoken favourably about the Royal
Family of Jordan (even if in the context of questioning having
closer economic ties with the kingdom):

Indeed her remarks in Parliament have been peppered with
references to the monarchy to an extent few others compare
to. But just because Elizabeth May has been eager has not
meant she has always been effective.

Recently she tweeted (and using Twitter to express herself
was probably the first mistake) a congratulatory message to
Jagmeet Singh, the new leader of the NDP, in which she
reminded him that Canada does not elect prime ministers and
that the presidentalization of the office was a worrying trend.
Mr. Singh had commented that "I'm officially launching my
campaign to be the next Prime Minister of Canada". While
Ms. May was correct the response was panned by nearly
everyone as condescending. This is unfortunate as Mr. Singh
has not been supportive of the monarchy. One would
hope as a fellow parliamentarian Elizabeth May could help
Mr. Singh see the monarchy in a new light. Her tweet did not
​do this.

Last year I had the chance to meet her in person and express
my appreciation for her support for Canada's monarchy. 
Small missteps aside she remains one of the few federal
politicians who I believe would give a full-throated defence of
​the monarchy if it were ever to be seriously threatened.   

Loyally Yours,
A Kisaragi Colour

By: Kevin Gillespie

During the academic year of 2014-15,
the Osgoode Constitutional Law
Society (OCLS) and the York Centre for
Public Policy & Law (YCPPL) held a
series of talks at Osgoode Hall Law
School on the topic of the Crown & the
Constitution. On January 28, 2015, we
held the second event in our speakers’
series, titled “Monarchy in Action:
Canada’s Vice-Regals at Work.” As part
of this event, Her Honour Elizabeth
Dowdeswell, the newly installed Lieutenant Governor of
Ontario, was joined by two eminent Canadian academics, and
experts in the field of Canada’s constitutional monarchy--
Father Jacques Monet, and Professor Peter Russell.

The following is a brief synopsis of each speaker’s
presentation. For those who are interested in the full hour and
a half presentation, I have included a link to the mp3 of the
event below.

Her Honour Elizabeth Dowdeswell,
Lieutenant Governor of Ontario
​
Her Honour began by discussing her role as the Queen’s
Representative in Ontario— an office which she described as
the product of a slow evolution from British colonial roots, to
its modern incarnation as the representative of the Crown in
Right of Ontario. The office represents our achievement of
responsible government, which Ontarians have enjoyed since
the 1840s. The Lieutenant Governor, representing the Queen
of Canada, is the protector of democracy and parliamentary
conventions in the province, and is hugely important to
understanding the historic and enduring relationship between
the Crown and Canada’s Aboriginal peoples.

The Lieutenant Governor has two principal constitutional
roles: (1) the legislative, representing the Crown in
Parliament; and (2) the executive, i.e. the Crown in Council.
​Reading the Speech from the Throne, providing Royal Assent,
and granting requests for prorogation or dissolution of the
Legislature are all examples of the legislative role, while the
executive side includes the approval of Orders in Council for
the day-to-day governance of the province, as well as ensuring
that there is always a premier and cabinet to run the province.
In other words, the executive role is something akin to the
Chief Executive Officer of the province. Citing Walter
Bagehot, Her Honour continued by referencing the famous
three constitutional rights of the Sovereign and her vice-regal
officers: (1) the right to be consulted; (2) the right to
encourage; and (3) the right to warn—all three of which were
apparently exercised in some form or other by Adrienne
Clarkson during her term as Governor General.

Further, the Crown also has an important role in supporting
community service, and representing the citizenry. Canada’s
vice-regal officers spend the vast majority of their time
undertaking public engagements and representing the Queen
of Canada in celebration of that which unites us as citizens.
This part of job plays a key role in enhancing social cohesion
and promoting a wider Canadian identity, free of the
partisanship of politics. The Vice-Regal Suites at Queen’s Park
presents a neutral space for community groups, and people
from all walks of life to enjoy. It is also at Queen’s Park that
Her Honour welcomes diplomatic leaders from around the
world on behalf of all Ontarians.

Her Honour also recognizes provincial excellence through
Ontario’s provincial Honours system, conferring such things
as the Order of Ontario, or medals for good citizenship,
voluntary service, or bravery. The Lieutenant Governor
travels widely throughout Ontario in her public role, with the
overarching theme of her mandate being the promotion of
Ontario’s role in a global world. Her Honour is an advocate
for a clearer transparency and understanding of the role of the
Lieutenant Governor, which is essential if the Crown is to
retain its relevance in the 21st Century. In this spirit, Her
Honour uses every public event as a sounding board to learn
about the various issues that are important to Ontarians.

Professor Peter Russell

Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of
Toronto, Peter Russell is one of Canada’s leading
parliamentary scholars. Recently his focus has been on
minority governments and constitutional conventions related
to parliamentary democracy; and in 2012 he contributed to a
larger collection of essays on the topic of the role of the Crown
in Canadian governance. Professor Russell used his
presentation to speak about the broader theme of constitutional monarchy, and its benefits in a parliamentary
system—particularly within the Canadian context.

Professor Russell began by decrying the neglected state of the
Crown as an area of academic study—a state of affairs that he
believes has led to the idea of republicanism being the default
position of many university students today, who can’t get past
the superficial criticism of inherited privilege. While
conceding that constitutional monarchy is a hard sell, he feels
that it is nonetheless important to try and convey its benefits
to a wider audience.

Despite the defects that are inherent in any particular form of
government, Professor Russell firmly believes that
constitutional monarchy is the best solution for Canada’s
particular form of parliamentary democracy. Its chief benefit
is the particular way in which a monarchical government can
separate the positions of head of government and head of
state—which he terms “duality at the top”. Unlike the republic
south of our border, Canada’s monarchical parliamentary
system grants most political power to a partisan prime
minister, while our highest office is reserved for a politically
neutral Queen (and her representatives), who steers clear of
political decisions in all but a few relatively rare situations.

According to Russell, the most important constitutional
function of the Crown is its role in determining who should
form a government that possesses the confidence of the
elected chamber. While it is usually an easy decision to simply
choose a prime minister by appointing the party leader who
has most recently won an election, when there is a hung
parliament, or a divided Cabinet, the decision can become
fraught with controversy. It is particularly in such situations
that Professor Russell believe that we are quite fortunate to
have a non-partisan head of state, able to act as a neutral
political referee and ultimate decision-maker, in order to
protect our democratic traditions.

Russell concedes that the head of state in a parliamentary
system does not have to be a monarch—in fact, in most
parliamentary systems, republican heads of state abound. In
such systems, a president is usually elected indirectly by
parliament (or sometimes directly by the people). A necessary
by-product of this form of government, however, is that the
head of state ends up being someone who has won some sort
of election, and who is almost certainly affiliated with a
political party. While many of these systems work pretty well,
others have gotten into trouble when parliamentary crises
inevitably arise. According to Russell, there is sometimes a
tendency for the democratically elected head of state (who can
lay claim to a certain amount of democratic legitimacy) to
challenge the prime minister—sometimes taking over--
thereby diminishing the duality at the top. Further, a
politically partisan elected head of state can run into
difficulties when exercising the politically neutral functions of
her office.

In a constitutional monarchy, such as Canada, the efficient
role of the Crown in governance has largely been ceded to
elected officials. But the residue remains, primarily in relation
to the life and death of Parliament. Usually these Royal
prerogative powers are exercised on the advise of the head of
government, but in rare exceptions the head of state may act
in her own right when following the advice of her prime
minister (or premier) would be constitutionally wrong, or
dangerous to our democratic traditions. An extreme case,
illustrated by Eugene Forsey, could occur when a prime
minister fails to achieve a desired majority after an election.
Instead of trying to form some sort of parliamentary coalition,
the prime minister might prefer to call a steady stream of
elections, one after the other, in order to achieve the “right”
result. According to Russell, this sort of extreme
electioneering would actually damage democracy, and so it
would be perfectly reasonable to expect our non-partisan
head of state to step in to protect democracy by saying “no” to
the head of government. It is this role in particular that a non-
partisan monarch can often perform better than a partisan
head of state.

While this particular role of the Crown has been likened to a
“constitutional fire extinguisher”, it is actually the “dignified”
role of the Crown that is most visible in Canadian governance,
and—if performed well—can strengthen the “moral sinews of
our democratic society.” Ironically, however, Professor
Russell believes that it is this part of the job that is often
underestimated by academics and intellectuals, who tend to
diminish the important ceremonial role of the monarch and
her representatives.

Like the efficient role of the Crown, it is better to have an
apolitical leader—who can represent the entirety of the state
and its people—perform these ceremonial duties, instead of a
politician who will find it hard to represent anyone other than
the faction of people who support his particular party.
According to Russell, monarchical heads of state, and their
vice-regal representatives, do this part of the job at least as
well, if not better, than republican heads of state. Further, the
Crown has been an invaluable source of unity between the
historic French, English and Aboriginal communities that
make up Canada. And as a Commonwealth Realm, we share
our head of state with 15 other countries around the globe. As
a result, we have a very experienced and international head of
state, unique to world history.
​
In conclusion, Professor Russell makes some interesting
comments on the origins of constitutional monarchy as a
system of government. Human beings did not invent this
particular form of constitutional monarchy; instead, it is a
governmental institution that has evolved without any
theoretical design, which nonetheless works extremely well.
Russell believes that those people who want to replace it out
of a misplaced ideological sense of correctness, make the
mistake of all children of The Enlightenment, who believe that
their brains are always better than history—a remarkably
foolish assumption. Paraphrasing Hegel, Russell finishes his
talk by declaring that sometimes the cunning of history
produces something that we, here and now, could never
invent. Russell believes that this is the case with the
monarchical solution to the head of state problem in a
parliamentary system.

Father Jacques Monet
Father Monet received his doctorate of history from the
University of Toronto in 1964, was ordained a Jesuit priest in
1966, and has taught at a number of schools throughout
Canada. He is director of the Canadian Institute of Jesuit
Studies, and is considered one of Canada’s leading historians.
He has also written extensively on the subject of the Canadian
Crown, and has acted as an advisor to Rideau Hall. Father
Monet is currently a member of the Advisory Committee on
Vice-Regal Appointments.

Father Monet begins his presentation by talking about the
important role of the Crown in relation to French Canada.
French Canada has always been a monarchy; first under the
French Kings, and then under successive British and
Canadian monarchs. Monet believes this uninterrupted reign
of Kings and Queens is unique in Western history, where even
England has suffered from an interregnum period in the 17th
Century. Unfortunately, however, this is a point that is largely
unknown to most Canadians today.

While modern Quebec is largely known for its particular
republican strain of separatism, historically and traditionally
it has strong monarchical roots. Eminent French Canadians,
such as Sir George-Étienne Cartier—one of the fathers of
Confederation—were ardent monarchists, and Monet believes
that under the separatist crust of modern Quebec lays a
largely loyal population. While the Queen was infamously
booed by radical Laval University students in 1964, the Queen
and members of the Royal Family have gone back to Quebec
several times to much better receptions. To this day, the
Governor General has an official residence in Quebec, and the
Lieutenant Governor continues to act as the highest executive
authority in the province—a situation that is unlikely to
change in the foreseeable future. Ironically, according to
Monet, René Lévesque, the separatist premier of the province
leading up to Patriation of the Constitution, was first among
the provincial premiers to agree that modifications to the role
of the Crown should require unanimous consent among the
provinces and the federal government in the new
constitutional structure of Canada.

After discussing the unique status of the monarchy in French
Canada, Father Monet ends his talk with a brief discussion of
the newly-instituted Advisory Committee of Vice-Regal
Appointments. According to Monet, one of the traditional
problems with Canada’s constitutional practice surrounding
the monarchy was that the appointment of the Governor
General or other vice-regal officers has to be done upon the
advice of the Prime Minister—giving past appointments (even
the most upstanding appointees among them) a partisan flair.
This situation has, unfortunately, cast a cloud over vice-regal
appointments.

In order to rectify this problem, Prime Minister Harper
created the non-partisan Committee in 2012 in order to help
make future appointments. The Committee is usually
composed of 5 members—3 permanent members (including
one Anglophone member; one French Canadian member,
represented by Father Monet; and one chairperson, who is
currently also the Canadian Secretary to the Queen) with 5
year terms; and 2 temporary members that are added from
the province or territory from which a vice-regal officer will be
appointed.

The first ad hoc committee (the Governor General
Consultation Committee) met in 2010 to help appoint David
Johnston as our current Governor General. After the
successful work of this initial Committee, the permanent
Advisory Committee on Vice-Regal Appointments was
constituted, and has since appointed several Lieutenant
Governors from among the various provinces, including
Ontario’s most recent Lieutenant Governor, Ms. Dowdeswell.

While conscious of the confidential nature of the Committee,
Father Monet does provide some interesting insight into its
inner workings. First, when it is time to look for a new
appointment, the Prime Minister appoints the two extra
temporary members (if it is a territorial commissioner or
lieutenant governor that is being appointed) and the entire
Committee has a meeting with the Prime Minister (which is
usually by phone). At this meeting the Prime Minister gives
some very vague instructions, and tells the Committee to
come back to him with five names for possible appointees.
There is no order of preference for the 5 candidates—each one
is equally “number one”.

After the Committee has been announced, the various
members of the Committee proceed to speak to various
stakeholders, such as the governments of the relevant
province or territory, and other eminent individuals and
organizations, including the Monarchist League of Canada, in
the search for candidates.

When the first ad hoc Committee was constituted to find the
current Governor General, they had 132 initial candidates,
which were subsequently whittled down over a three day
period to get the 5 nominations that were requested.
According to Father Monet, this process wasn’t easy; between
the first evening and 4 am the next morning, the Committee
was able to get the list down to 20 candidates. However, it
took them a another 2 days to make the remaining cuts.

Finally, after this process is completed, the Prime Minister
meets with the Committee to go over the final candidates, and
asks each member to name their personal preference from
among the list. According to Monet, sometimes each member
of the Committee has his own preference for number 1; while
other times the ultimate preferences are unanimous.

In addition to the current Governor General, who was selected
under the initial ad hoc Committee, the new permanent
Committee has helped to choose several vice-regal officers,
including the Lieutenant Governors of Ontario and Manitoba.
Monet believes that this new process is the best thing that
been has done to strengthen Canada’s monarchical form of
government, and argues that it has effectively addressed the
criticism of partisanship that has attached itself to past
appointees.
​
While the Prime Minister still ultimately chooses the
appointee, he has limited himself to a list of 5 candidates,
each one of whom has come from a committee that did not
involve the Prime Minister in the nomination process—except
for the brief hour-long meeting at the end, where he asked the
members about their ultimate choices. Father Monet hopes
that this new body lasts long enough that it will become a
constitutional fixture in its own right.

​Edited by Kevin Gillespie,
Chair of the Osgoode Constitutional Law Society

So the Canadian election is underway (number 42 for those
keeping track). The candidates are slowly revving up their
campaigns and the media has gone into full election mode. I thought this might be a good time to get into a topic I've
mulling over for some time.

Republicans like to say that the monarchy is an undemocratic
institution. I would like to dissect that claim.

For starters republicans tend to base their claims on the
position being unelected. The monarch/governor general is
neither the only unelected position in the government nor the
most common. That distinction goes to the entire judicial branch. They have even rejected laws passed by a democratic
Parliament (something the Monarch of Canada has never
done). And yet I don't see anyone clamoring to elect the
Supreme Court. And why would they? There is understanding (based in part on observing our neighbors to the South) that
electing members of the judiciary would not help the courts
do a better job and might in fact damage them through
partisanship. There is an understanding that, under specific
circumstances, it is not desirable to elect a position.

We choose to elect Members of Parliament because we
recognize that partisan competition fuels debate and helps
keep everyone on their best behavior. We do this with the full knowledge that said competition can, and does, create
divisions in society (as the last 10 years makes clear). The
office of the monarch is not a position that requires elections
as it is not a position that crafts policy. The Crown is there to
provide stability, non-partisan leadership and to represent
Canada. It is also the hidden emergency button in case
Canada goes off the rails. None of these roles are enhanced
by elections.

And, as I have noted before, directly-elected heads of state
have been shown to cause a 5-7% decrease in voter turnout
for legislative elections. Indirectly-elected presidents also
have difficulties it has been found.

Another claim that republicans make is that the monarchy
is somehow undemocratic by virtue of being hereditary. This
is expressed as the monarchy being an "anachronism" or
"medieval" institution. You want to know what other 
position is hereditary? Citizenship. Once gained, citizenship
is passed on regardless of qualifications or behavior. It also
confers specific rights on its holders (voting rights for one).
But citizens don't hold a place in government, I can hear you saying. Don't they? The republican ideal is a government of the people, by the people, for the people. In the republican
ideal the people are central to the formation and execution of government. And a government based on the people's
participation cannot escape being based on the hereditary
rights of citizenship.

The monarchist ideal is different. Coming out of the Medieval
period there was an understanding within English practice 
(and to a degree, in all of Europe) that the monarch must
consult with the people in governing the country. In Canada
we have a supreme right to be consulted as subjects of Her Majesty. Incidentally the monarch shares this right to have
consultation. In fact the monarch's rights are often a mirror of
the people's rights. Another example is the coronation oath
and the citizenship oath. The monarch promises in the
coronation oath to reign in accordance with Canada's laws
and customs while in the citizenship oath the people promise
much the same towards the monarch.

So why is this important? Because a government that can
reject the monarchy on the basis of its hereditary nature can
reject a citizen's unqualified right to vote on the same
grounds. We use hereditary selection when we want to
prevent an office, group, or position from becoming
monopolized by interest groups. The citizenship can never be
cut down to only people who believe the same things because
it is hereditary. The monarchy cannot become a prize for a
specific partisan viewpoint to capture for the same reason.

Some knowledgeable republicans object to monarchy based
on its association with divine right. While divine right did
play a part in the monarchy's history, it was neither a primary
justification for monarchical rule or even an uncontested one.

It is also not a current justification. Monarchs in Britain or in
Canada have never reigned by divine right. This is because in
1688 the Glorious Revolution occurred. It fundamentally and
definitively changed the monarchy from being based on
divine right to being based on the consent of Parliament.
While certain phrases such as 'by the grace of god' have been
kept they hide the fact that the monarch reigns by the consent
of Parliament, not the authority of God.

While the Rob Fords of the world can cling to power through
appeals to their democratic selection the monarchy is in a far
more precarious position. A monarch who tried to abuse power would simply be gone. Without democratic legitimacy
the monarch is counterfactually more accountable to the
people.

A related difficulty is when two democratically-elected offices
come into conflict. With both able to claim to represent the
people the argument can become messy and often boils down
to who can better use the powers of the state. The monarch
has no such recourse and must acquiesce to the democratic
office.

Republicans should not be allowed to get away with using
appeals to democracy to shut down debate. Monarchists can,
and should, make the argument that, far from being an undemocratic institution, the monarchy is Canada's most unappreciated democratic institution.

Loyally Yours,
A Kisaragi Colour

If you've been paying attention
to national news at all over the
last few years you'd know the
Canadian Senate is currently
stuck in a never-ending scandal
regarding expenses. The scandal
has produced a number of
possible remedies. Prime
Minister Stephen Harper upped
the ante last week by saying he
would not appoint anymore
senators in an effort to try and
bring the provinces to the table
(their support being needed if
the Upper Chamber is to be
changed in any meaningful way).
Given how much the Senate Scandal has burned the Prime
Minister I can't imagine he is in any hurry to appoint anyone
else to that body. However, this strategy is already being
challenged in court by Aniz Alani, a BC lawyer. He is
seeking to get the courts to rule on whether the Prime
Minister is constitutionally required to name senators or not.

So what does the constitution say on the matter? Section 24
states that "The Governor General shall from Time to Time,
in the Queen’s Name, by Instrument under the Great Seal of
Canada, summon qualified Persons to the Senate; and,
subject to the Provisions of this Act, every Person so
summoned shall become and be a Member of the Senate and
a Senator." Note that the constitution refers only to the
Governor General, not the Prime Minister. This is a vital fact
being lost in the whole story. Mr. Alani's court challenge
focuses on whether the Prime Minister has to render advice to
the Governor General. However, this advice is a convention,
not a law or legal precedent. And as any student of Canadian
law will tell you the courts don't rule on conventions. So it
would appear that the main thrust of the court challenge will
fail. The courts may weigh in on another issue though. The
courts may well state that the Governor General must make
appointments to the Senate. This would be in line with what
the constitution actually says. The courts have already stated
that the Senate cannot be allowed to simply whither away 
through non-appointment. Another ruling would cement this
principle.

So where would this leave us? If the Prime
Minister still refuses to advise the Governor
General we may witness the rarest of political
birds: the death of a convention. Governor
General David Johnston would be the one in the 
position of having to create a new rule for Senate
appointments. Normally, when the Governor
General has to act outside of established convention it either
provokes, or is caused by, a constitutional crisis. In this case
the sheer unpopularity of the Senate and the slow pace of
Senate appointments gives His Excellency some breathing
room to find a solution. Here is how it would possibly go:

The Governor General tries to convince the Prime
Minister to reconsider and give him names. He might
even mention that by long tradition he has a Right to be
Consulted. His Excellency could warn the Prime Minister that
his actions were set to trigger a constitutional crisis. And His
Excellency could encourage the Prime Minister to appoint
new senators (hopefully men & women of higher moral fibre).
In short, the Governor General would make use of Bagehot's
Three Rights of the Crown.

If Prime Minister Stephen Harper still refused to
appoint senators the Governor General may decide to
wait him out. Perhaps the next Prime Minister would be
willing to advise the Crown on this matter. This strategy has
two flaws though. 1. The party most likely to take over from
the governing Conservatives doesn't want to appoint senators
either (for that matter they don't want the Senate to exist). 2.
The Governor General can't delay on this matter forever. They
may have to do something before a more cooperative Head of
Government appears.

With all options for maintaining the current convention
exhausted the Governor General (and it may not even be
David Johnston at this point) would have to act on their own.
They could act on their own accord in making appointments
but this is unlikely. A non-elected official appointed members
of an unelected chamber no one likes would cause too much
damage to the vice-regal office. It may even damage the
monarchy. Any occupant of the Governor General's office who
respects said office would shy away from this option. And this
is assuming the newly-appointed senators were high quality.
If they were caught misusing public funds the damage would
be magnified. There is no political 'victory' with senate
appointments. The Governor General would need a different
strategy.

The Governor General could request Parliament render
advice on senate appointments. However, with two of
Canada's main parties opposing senate appointments this
may not work. If not the last foreseeable resort would be to
ask the provincial premiers for advice. There is one last option
that might be open to the Governor General but I will leave
that to another article.

His Excellency's job may well be about to become quite a bit
more interesting. All because of an upstart lawyer, a stubborn
prime minister, and a scandal-plagued senate.

Loyally Yours,
A Kisaragi Colour

Parliament is an old institution. For this reason its origins are
not well known and often misunderstood. Let's see if we can
fix that.

Starting in the 7th century the Anglo-Saxon monarchy
contained a handful of Witenagemots (meetings of wise men)
acted as advisory bodies for the king. The Witenagemots were
assemblies comprised of powerful landowners. Beyond these
two facts little is known about them. We don't know if the
Witenagemots were an aristocratic evolution of the earlier Germanic folkmoots (general assembly) nor whether the
Witenagemots had any formal powers beyond that wielded by
individual members. We do know that there was no single
'national' Witenagemot and that the summoning of the
meeting was a prerogative of the king. Further, the
Witenagemots had no set meeting location but would meet at
least once per year.

However, in the tradition of the Witenagemots we see a first
principle of the English Monarchy taking shape: that the king
rules in consultation with others.

In 1066 William the Conqueror
was crowned King of England.
The various Witenagemots
ceased to be (partially due to so
many of the Anglo-Saxon elites
being dispossessed of their 
lands. The Normans had their
own tradition of aristocratic
advice in the form of the Curia
Ducis (duke's council). Across
Europe the situation was much the same with kings and great
lords having bodies of advisers to assist in governing. 

Once William the Conqueror was secure on the English
throne he created the Curia Regis (King's Council). Like the
Witenagemots it was comprised of the leading nobles of the
day. It differed in most other respects though. The Curia Regis
had two forms; the Magnum Concilium which was summoned
by the king to discuss issues of national importance and the
Lesser Curia Regis which was in session continually and
traveled with the king. The two types of Curia Regis were
considered to be the same body and not separate entities.
Indeed, the membership overlapped a great deal.

In this body we see the beginnings of two important
developments: a cabinet-like group and the creation of a
single national deliberative body.

In 1204 King Philip II of France seized the lands governed by
King John of England (in his role as Duke of Normandy).
King John attempted to get them back but required a great
deal of money to do so. While many of England's barons had
also had lands in France the loss of those lands effected them
differently. The Norman nobility's French lands had served as
a distraction from the affairs and concerns of England. When
those lands were lost they began to focus more on English
affairs. King John's war began to look to them as a foreign
adventure. Failure in 1214 compounded this view.

The Angevin kings had been able to use this distracted
nobility to rule via 'force and will'. That the nobility made a
great deal of money from their continental possessions kept
everyone content, if not happy, with the situation. The loss of
those lands made King John's heavy taxation and refusal to
consult his barons into a major grievance. The belief that the
king should rule in accordance with custom and the law was
greatly strengthened. 

While the loss of lands in France had no immediate effect on
the evolution of Parliament, it was necessary for the future of
the legislative branch. A nobility content to be ignored by the
king as long as their estates were prosperous would never be a
firm foundation for a body such as Parliament.

In 1215 King John signed the Magna Carta presented to him
by his nobility. That the king and his nobles were not on
friendly terms is best symbolized by the meeting location; a
bit of watery land beside the River Thames unable of
supporting cavalry. The charter reaffirmed the old rights of
the nobility and certain legal protections.

The Magna Carta has taken on an importance over the years it
likely never had when it was first signed. It has come to be
seen as the first stirring of constitutional government. In this
short history of Parliament it is important because it failed.
Neither side lived up to their obligations and war returned.

King John then had the misfortune to die and leave a young
heir.

While Henry III spent his early reign dominated by a regency
of barons his own rule mirrored his father's. Lack of
consultation gradually led the barons to lose faith in him. The
Magnum Concilium was at this point only called for the
approval of new taxes. It was certainly not called on to advise
the king. The barons eventually decided that they had had
enough and refused the king's latest tax request. In 1258 King
Henry III faced a major financial crisis and agreed to a set of
limitations known as the Provisions of Oxford. A Parliament
would meet three times per year to oversee the performance
of the bureaucracy. However, the barons proved unable to
work together and the king returned to ruling arbitrarily.

A new round of rebellions broke out led by Simon de
Montfort, Earl of Leicester. The king was captured in 1264
and for the next fifteen months Simon de Montfort ruled in
the king's name until his defeat by the soon-to-be Edward I.

The reign of Henry III confirmed the old ways were no longer
working. The king wanted to govern effectively, the barons
wanted to be consulted. Neither the king alone nor the barons
alone had been able to effectively govern the country. It fell to
the new King Edward I to find a way to reconcile royal
authority with baronial power. He would do this through
Parliament.

During his short ascendancy Simon de Montfort had
summoned a Magnum Concilium that for the first time
included the shire knights and burgesses as well as the
nobility. This move was meant to strengthen his hold on
power by widening the interested parties beyond the nobility.
King Edward I would likewise call both groups to Parliament
often during his reign. The king experimented endlessly with
Parliament's composition and its power and role remained
fluid.

Perhaps more importantly, King Edward I began to use
Parliament to make statutory law on a scale never before
dreamed of. I have consistently used the term 'deliberative'
rather than 'legislative' to describe the various councils and
assemblies detailed in this article. This is because in England
laws were considered a matter of custom, not statute. The
king was responsible for interpreting and clarifying custom
but could not change it. Of course, it is a thin line between
interpreting law and making it. Some kings had been
lawgivers in practice but never much in theory. 

This is contrary to a certain narrative that claims the ability to
legislate was wrestled away from increasingly arbitrary kings
by Parliament. This is not the case. The monarchy gained the
ability to legislate through the creation of Parliament.

By using meetings of leading barons, churchmen, knights, and
townspeople King Edward I was able to pass legislation
without the worry it might cause a revolt. Throughout his
reign Parliament was very much his creature and he used it to
strengthen the monarchy's authority.

Parliament had been born.

I hope you have enjoyed this brief look at Parliament's beginnings. 

Loyally Yours,
A Kisaragi Colour

In a previous article I lamented the lack of research on what effects having a monarchy has on a country. Since then I have come across a few more studies outlining advantages monarchies possess. These studies suggest that monarchies tend towards healthier democratic practices. It is of some passing interest that none of these studies set out to prove anything about monarchies. In one case the researcher even seemed surprised at the results.

The first study is Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do Direct Elections Matter? From the title you can probably tell that the author did not set out to study constitutional monarchies. In fact they are dealt with after the fact in a footnote. The end conclusion is that presidential republics suffer more voter fatigue and a drop in votes for legislative elections of about 5-7% than either constitutional monarchies or legislative republics. (UPDATE: While the original post uses 'presidential' and 'legislative' descriptors it should in fact be 'directly-elected' and 'indirectly-elected' respectively. While most legislative republics use indirect election via a legislature, some do not.)

This is a serious issue for republicans. The current prevailing model put forward by (Canadian) republicans is that we could become a republic simply by making the Governor General an elected position. However, as the above study demonstrates, this would be harmful to our democracy (which may already suffer from some voter fatigue due to federalism). To support this option puts republicans in the uncomfortable position of advocating making our democracy worse, not better. So how about election by Parliament? This has its own problems. Politicians are likely to never support such a model until the Senate issue is settled and we have proportional representation. Going ahead without reforming these two things would put the governing party in a dictatorial position of having unlimited control of all three parts of Parliament. A second issue concerns whether Canadians would support such a 'politician's republic'. Indeed, it was the Australians preference for a presidential republic (in contrast to their leaders) that helped save their monarchy.

The second study is Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets. The study points out that while monarchs often possess powers comparable to those of strong presidential systems they behave more like presidents of legislative republics. However, there still turned out to be a difference:

As the chart shows, constitutional monarchy was the only government form where early elections were the preferred method  discretionary government replacement. Both legislative and presidential republics have a strong preference for choosing a new government from Parliament without resorting to an election. Therefore, if you consider consulting the people more often to be more democratic you must also conclude that constitutional monarchies have a leg up in this area.

The third study is Determinants of generalized trust: A cross-country comparison. This study doesn't deal with democracy directly but with how much people in a country trust each other and why (trust being an important factor in many economic and social considerations). According to this study there are only a limited number of factors that appear to increase trust among the populous. Both greater equality of wealth and having a monarchy were found to increase trust levels. And since it is possible (despite what republicans like to claim) to be both a monarchy and highly equal it makes sense that the three Scandinavian monarchies are at the top of the trust index (and most other indexes).

Notably, being a democracy didn't increase how much people trusted each other. That is not to say its not important. Trust is thought to build political institutions, of which democracy is one. So anything that increases trust strengthens a countries democracy since the people have the firm belief their fellow citizens aren't out to screw them.

This study dovetails nicely with the previous study I looked at. One of the theories it suggested was that monarchies actually liberalized earlier than republics. Taken together it is reasonable to suggest that if a country is going to become a democracy doing so as a monarchy will be less painful overall.

It is becoming increasingly clear as I research that keeping Canada's monarchy safe from republicans isn't just about protecting our traditions, it is about preserving the quality of our democracy.

As always, the new studies have been added to Useful Links.

Loyally Yours,
A Kisaragi Colour

Cross-posted from monarchistnb

A significant royal anniversary recently passed us by, and I did not want to let it go by completely unnoticed or without comment. I don’t find as much time to post on this blog as I might like to do, but this is an important milestone for our Monarchy.

The 1st of August 2014 marked the three hundredth anniversary of the death of Queen Anne of Great Britain, the last of the unfortunate Stewarts to reign over Scotland and England. The reigns of her predecessors, stretching back to her great-grandfather, James VI of Scotland and I of England, were often marred by ill relations with Parliament. Few others are more well-known for their dealings with the House of Commons than Anne’s grandfather, Charles I, whose head was among the many things rent asunder by Cromwell and his cronies. And James II, Anne’s unfortunate father, was driven from his kingdom for his Catholicism. James’ ‘abdication’ paved the way for the accession of his daughter and son-in-law, Mary and William, the champions of “The Protestant Succession”, and later his second daughter, Anne.

By the time of Queen Anne’s death, however, relations between Sovereign and Parliament were somewhat improved, but it was at the expense of the Royal Prerogatives and Powers. It would the next several Sovereigns who succeeded Queen Anne who completed the process of evolution towards Constitutional Monarchy in Britain and thus also in Canada.

Queen Anne was succeeded by Georg Ludwig, Elector of Hanover, who was a descendant of James I through his daughter Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, and who became King George I. Queen Anne had far less distant relations who could have become the next Sovereign (a wikipedia list gives a list of 55 individuals who had a better claim to the throne than Georg Ludwig at the time of the Queen’s death in 1714) but the Act of Settlement, 1701, barred them from the throne for their Catholicism. This discriminatory part of the British Constitution (and subsequently of the constitutions of the independent nations of the Commonwealth) was repealed prior to the birth of Prince George of Cambridge, along with male primogeniture and the 1774 requirement for all descendants of George II to ask the Queen’s permission to marry.

The succession of the Hanoverian dynasty changed the course of British and Commonwealth constitutional history. That much is certain. It led to the two Jacobite Rebellions and all the associated unpleasantness between England and Scotland. There’s little point in speculating exactly how differently things would have turned out if King James’ son “The Old Pretender” has ascended the throne in place of the George I. Might the old Stewart belief in the Divine Right of Kings have reared its head and caused the downfall of the Monarchy? Or might the dynasty which established British rule over America have been more successful in avoiding the Revolutionary War? The “what ifs” are endless.

What we do know is the the reigns of the first four Georges, William IV and Queen Victoria ushered in the style of constitutional monarchy which we enjoy today. It was an era during which the Sovereign ceased to rule and instead reigned over his/her subjects. And it undoubtedly the flexibility of the Monarchy in Britain and the Commonwealth which has allowed it to survive in an era where Kings and Queens are far outnumbered by Presidents and Dictators.

Loyally Yours,
Barry R. MacKenzie